More often today discussions of Taiwan's reunification with China revolve not around questions of "what if" it happens, but "when" and "how." This month, Asia Times Online published an exhaustively detailed scenario for a military confrontation between Taiwan and China. The article by Wendell Minnick not only raised eye-brows in Taiwan for its unflinching, and often unflattering look at local military readiness, but it was quickly picked up by the international news wires, even becoming “required reading” during Asia-region briefings at the U.S. Department of Defense.

In a Q&A session with Taiwan Ho! Minnick expanded upon some of the topics touched on in his recent articles.

Minnick has made a career covering military and intelligence developments in East Asia, particularly as they effect the balance of power across the Taiwan Straits. Since 2000 he has served as Taipei correspondent for Jane's Defense Weekly, the defense and foreign affairs profession’s primary information resource for military matters, as well as written for several on-line and print publications covering Asian affairs.

Taiwan Ho!
Your most recent article for Asia Times, in which you presented a possible scenario for a decisive military attack by mainland China on Taiwan, was titled "The Year to Fear: 2006". In the article you speculate that 2006 is a likely date for China to use the military option with regards to Taiwan for a variety of reasons--it would give China enough time to achieve military superiority over the island's forces while allowing the political fallout to subside in time for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Has the recent election, the ensuing political turmoil stemming from the assassination attempt on the president, and the protests that followed the re-election of Chen Shui-bian caused you to rethink that date?

Wendell Minnick
The basic article was written during the political turmoil. I had considered changing part of the scenario to include China using the political problems between the KMT and DPP as an excuse to intervene. Not all that different from US excuses to invade Haiti, Grenada or Panama—to secure regional security and safety. China could have used this excuse, and perhaps still might, installing the “rightful winners” of the election into power. It sounds crazy, but the US does it all the time in the name of regional stability. You can argue about whether China could really get away with it, but once they took control of the country, well…

Should China be thought of as a paper tiger, always threatening to invade but never taking action?

I think that China does not have the psychological confidence to attack Taiwan at this time. It has deep-seated fears of failure. If China would attempt to invade Taiwan and fail to do so, it would be a major loss of face for the Communist Party. It is hard to imagine what would happen in Beijing after a screw up like that. But the bottom line is China is beefing up—producing more weapons, upgrading its air force, building more naval vessels. China has roughly 30,000 special forces/airborne troops. That is such an incredible number in military terms. When you put together that many men, questions come begging.

In your most recent article you say that in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, China would likely launch a lightning airborne attack aimed at cutting Taipei off from the rest of the island rather than a massive "D-Day" style amphibious assault. You wrote that the goal of such an attack would be to quickly cut off the command and control "head" of Taiwan's defense forces. The greater Taipei area is, of course, one of the most heavily populated civilian areas on the island. Do you have any thoughts on what the toll would be on the civilian population if such an attack took place?

The idea in writing the story was to start a debate, which has been waning in the government and academic community, about a possible “minimum warning invasion.” Many in the community attacked the arguments I made, but overall it got a very good response. Whether Taiwan is really in danger of an attack in 2006 is truly speculative on my part. In the past, almost all the arguments were for an amphibious assault similar to Normandy. Then this year US military folks were telling me that new attention was being focused on an airborne assault that took Taipei first. Part of this came out of the recent Iraq war, when US forces took Baghdad first, then spread across the country with little resistance. Articles out of mainland Chinese military journals began coming out with “decapitation strategies,” so there was this shift in thinking that got the attention of many.

What the civilian costs of a war with China would be depends largely on the length and intensity of the battle. I doubt that China would want to destroy Taipei. That would ruin the whole purpose. Missile strikes would probably take out the airbases with few civilian casualties. Our lives, as foreigners, would change. We probably would not be welcome in a unified Taiwan. The locals would probably suffer greatly under Chinese occupation.

Taiwan in general has a large foreign population, a portion of which would likely become casualties of any large-scale military action, particularly in densely populated urban areas. Do you think that this fact coupled with the possible political fallout that could result from international residents dying in the crossfire is something that figures into China's military planning?

I think the presence of foreigners living in Taiwan is of no concern to China. It might be used as an excuse by the US to intervene—to protect the lives of US citizens. Taiwan has a large number of ‘US passport holders’, and that could be used as an excuse to try and intercede. It’s a common tactic by the US. Grenada is a good example. In addition, and this comes straight from the US government people I have talked to about this, do not expect an orchestrated evacuation by the US government or military of US citizens out Taiwan. The reason? There are just too many of us. There had been talk of a “hot evac” using helicopters landing in the football field behind Taipei American School, but that was dropped. It would be insanity. If you are not on an airplane out of the country before the attack begins, you will be stuck here until it ends.

You have written that the numeric and technical superiority sought by PLA is not the only thing Taiwan has to fear. You point to long running problems within command structure of the ROC military as well as a lack of professionalism and readiness among its average soldiers. Can you elaborate on this?

Taiwan’s non-commissioned officer (NCO) program is a joke. There are some good NCOs, but overall they do not have the competence needed to do the job. There have been numerous complaints about NCOs riding desks when they should be out in the field leading and training their men. No one complains more about the NCOs than US defense contractors who come to Taiwan to work with the military.

In 2002 an American technician told me of his frustrations while working with them. He was working on one of Taiwan's US-made Patriot surface-to-air missiles when a Taiwanese NCO army officer walked up and asked an innocent question: "Would you stay if China attacked Taiwan and help us?" The American said, "Sure, but you'd have to give me an M-16." And the Taiwanese replied, "Why? To defend yourself?" "No," the American replied. "To shoot you with."

It might take another generation of Taiwanese, more attuned to being Taiwanese and being proud of the fact, to make the kinds of changes in the military that are necessary. Unfortunately, I wonder if they have a generation to wait.

Are the problems that exist with Taiwan's military fixable? It is, after all, a military of conscripts drawn from a relatively small country whose job it is to defend itself against the world’s most populous nation.

Conscription has become a bit of a joke here in Taiwan. It is not even a two-year enlistment. They have it down to 20 months now. Soon it will be 18 months. You cannot maintain a well-trained military under the current program. To make matters worse, political correctness has almost ruined the military. The boot camp is more like a Girl Scout camp. Conscripts have told me that it was a “joke” and “too easy.” You lose a lot of respect for command when you do not get properly indoctrinated. Commanders are more afraid of angering the parents of conscripts than an invasion from China. That is why I argue that they won’t stand and fight, at least, not now.

What do you think of some politician's plans to reduce the length of national service, down from 20 months to possibly as few as three?

It appears more designed to pacify the parents than a real concern for a violent attack on Taiwan. Imagine thousands of Chinese soldiers raping and pillaging in Taipei and across Taiwan. Political correctness just doesn’t apply here. It’s insanity. It’s like covering yourself with honey and jumping face first into an anthill. That’s what Taiwan is doing.

If you were to consult Taiwan's military on how to better deter China from military action or prepare itself in the event of an invasion, what would your advice be?

I would urge them to beef up the infantry and special forces, especially the marines. Double their numbers. Toughen them. I would also produce surface-to-surface missiles capable of hitting Shanghai. It is the only practical deterrent there is. I would also invite retired US military folks to act as “advisors”. There are plenty of retired military officers with solid combat experience that could come in and just hang out with the troops. Kind of like the Big Brother program, except they’d be adopting a brigade. Taiwan could claim they were “English teachers” if anyone complained. It could work, but you would have to get the officers to go along with it. There is a lot of suspicion amongst Taiwan’s military officers of the US. They just don’t trust the Americans after being abandoned in 1979.

Your articles on Taiwan's military readiness have been well received by international policy makers including the US Department of Defense. What sort of response have you received from local officials and the ROC military, given that you paint a less-than-rosy picture?

They hated it. They don’t like outsiders speculating about their capabilities. When I first began working for Jane’s in April 2000, the military drove me nuts. They would invite all the journalists on military trips to visit bases and units. I did not get invited. When I did it was always at the last minute, like 1 a.m. in the morning. Then I’d say, “You want me to be at the airport at 6 a.m.?” Of course, I couldn’t change my schedule that quickly. One time they sent me to the wrong airport. Another time they told me to be at the airport at 8 a.m., but the plane left at 7 a.m. It was straight out of their training from the Political Warfare Academy, and it made it difficult to communicate with them. Had they made an effort early, I would have warned them of my story about the eavesdropping facility run jointly by the US NSA and Taiwan’s NSB on Yangmingshan. I wrote it without consulting them. And when it ran they had no warning, totally unprepared, totally angry. It was like a bomb going off.

Today they make an effort. Now I go almost everywhere. I have been to Tatan and Erhtan Islands near China, the special forces training school, almost all the airbases, and have been out to sea on several of the navy’s destroyers and frigates. I’ve asked permission to jump with the airborne, but they turn green every time I mention it. Nonetheless I keep pushing. They also have a liaison officer who meets with me privately each week and I often warn him of stories I have written that are about to appear in Jane’s. Usually they get no more than a few days warning, but they appreciate it. They’ve seen the results in Jane’s. My stories sometimes upset them, but they also know that folks in Washington are reading and talking about them. So overall it’s a big help to them.

There are many who would argue that it is the Taiwan Relations Act, which guarantees that the US would use its military force protect Taiwan from mainland aggression, has been more of a deterrent than Taiwan's own military might. Given that the US has found its military capabilities stretched lately with actions underway in Iraq and Afghanistan, how ready is the US to come to Taiwan's aid should China launch an attack?

This is a major problem right now. With US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, there are some real concerns that China could take advantage of the situation. Many of the scenarios paint this picture—US forces bogged down in the Middle East and China makes its move. China really has to consider the overall US military presence in Asia. US forces have bases in Japan, Korea, Guam, and Hawaii. They could certainly make China’s plan go down the drain very quickly. I am tired about reading newspaper articles talking about where the (USS) Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier is now, as if that was the only thing around to save the day. It shows you how bad the media covers military affairs.

What of China forming closer military partnerships with European nations such as France, with whom the first-ever joint exercises were held on the eve of the presidential election?

I thought the event was a non-event. France has always gone its own way without consulting with the US. However, if Europe lifts the arms embargo against China then I think the problems for East Asia, not just Taiwan, would be unimaginable. Japan and South Korea would have to rethink the position of US military forces in Asia. There are elements in both countries that have been pushing for the removal of US troops, but I suspect that would change overnight.

China seems quite angry about the recent decision by the Pentagon to sell Taiwan a new missile defense system. Will it help guard against the air strikes you talk about in your article?

I thought that it was staged event. The sale has been in the works for years. It shows how silly China looks. China’s getting ready to throw a spear at you and you buy a shield, and China say’s “hey, what the hell is this?”

Your Asia Times article focuses in most part on China's conventional capabilities, what about its preparedness and/or willingness to use other military options against Taiwan, such as chemical, biological or nuclear weapons?

I don’t believe that China would use NBC weapons against Taiwan, or on anyone else. Nukes would defeat the whole purpose of capturing Taiwan. Biological weapons can’t be controlled. Once a germ is released into the environment it kills both the enemy and your own troops. Chemical weapons just make the biggest mess and require years of expensive clean up—a real toxic waste nightmare.

We have seen in Iraq over the last few months that the invasion of a country and the installation of a new political structure does not necessarily bring about an end to military action. Should China invade, what are the chances that local resistance would continue on a smaller scale, perhaps through bands of armed insurgents?

Except for a few diehards, I believe most in Taiwan would do nothing. There is sort of a resignation in people’s voices here when they talk about reunification with China. Also, the Iraq example does not work here. The Middle East is full of radical insurgents and Iraq has fluid borders making it easy to enter. Taiwan is an island and it would be almost impossible to wage a guerrilla war here without serious outside help. No, if China invaded, it would be over for Taiwan.

You have written extensively about military matters and, particularly, intelligence gathering. What is your own background in these areas?

I’m not special. I haven’t got a spooky past or a military record. I think that I am just really dogged and I do tons of research. I wrote one book on intelligence in 1992 called Spies and Provocateurs: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of Persons Conducting Espionage and Covert Action. It got a lot of attention and catapulted me into the field. I began writing articles for the Far Eastern Economic Review, Army, Military Intelligence, etc. I was invited to join the CIA’s veterans group, the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, which was great fun.

In 1995, I wrote an unpublished book on the history of CIA operations in China, but I dropped the project. I sometimes think about resurrecting it, but Jane’s keeps me busy. In 1997, I went to South Korea to write a book on North Korean intelligence operations, the government had me followed and finally arrested me. I was interrogated and expelled from the country. I was shocked they took such an interest in me. It was a lesson in what it meant to work in my field. Today nothing bothers me. It’s a fun job. I have done things that other journalists say, “well you should not write about that,” but ultimately that’s my job. If they can’t write about it because they fear retribution or censure, then I think they should move into another field.


Wendell Minnick is the Taipei correspondent for Jane's Defense Weekly. His articles have been appeared in numerous print and online journals covering security and intelligence related topics in Asia. He is author of the book Spies and Provocateurs: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of Persons Conducting Espionage and Covert Action.

What do you think? Have your say in our China Attacks! thread in the Forums.